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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
union underfederal law may lawfully engage in concerted activ-
ity in support of the demand, would be inconsistent with the
federal law, and consequently invalid.
Perhaps the better way out lies in a proposal such as that
sponsored by Senator Thomas of Utah.23 He would amend Section
8 (3), among others, to read, "Provided, That nothing in this Act,
or in any state law, shall preclude an employer engaged in com-
merce or whose activities affect commerce, from making an agree-
ment with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of
employment membership therein . . . ." (Italics supplied.) This,
at least, would have the merit of freeing an employer from a
dilemma that might seriously threaten his undoing.
ROBERT B. SHAW
LIBEL AND SLANDER-LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-SINGLE PUBLI-
CATION RULE-Defendant publisher commenced distribution of
the final printing of "Total Espionage," an allegedly libelous book,
in March 1944, and released copies from stock in the year imme-
diately preceding July 2, 1946, the date of suit. Held, that the
publication of a single printing of a libelous book affords only
one cause of action, which arises when the first copy is released
by the publisher for sale in accord with trade practice, and that
subsequent sales from stock do not give rise to new causes of
action, although they may be considered in assessing damages.
Hence, the action was barred by a one-year statute of limitations.'
The court thus extended the "single publication" rule, 2 adopted
for magazines and newspapers, to books. Gregoire v. G. P. Put-
nam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E. (2d) 45 (1948).
Several policy considerations have led a number of juris-
dictions3 to adopt the "single publication" rule and to abandon
the common law rule which holds that each time a libel is
brought to the attention of a third person a new publication
occurs4 and that each publication is a new cause of action. 5 These
23. This bill is a substitute for the original S. 249, introduced by Senator
Thomas. The original bill did not have the proviso excluding state laws.
1. Thompson's Laws of New York (1939) C.P.A. § 51(3).
2. McGlue v. Weekly Publications, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 744 (D.C. Mass. 1946);
Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193, 37 A. L. R.
898 (1921); Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N.E.(2d) 708 (1948);
Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S.W. 496 (1907); Wolfson v.
Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 640, 254 App. Div. 211, affirmed 279
N.Y. 716, 18 N.E.(2d).676 (1939).
3. See note 2, supra.
4. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q.B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849);
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considerations are (1) to avoid a multiplicity of suits,6 (2) to
encourage promptness in bringing suit,7 and (3) to outlaw stale
claims.8
The "single publication" rule has not encouraged promptness
in bringing suit; but has, in fact, had the opposite effect. The
injured party in each of the leading cases decided under this rule
attempted to wait until the last day of the statutory period in
order to get the full benefit of damages, 9 since he had only one
cause of action'0 and was unable to get injunctive relief against
future publication of the libel." This has led the plaintiff, in
many cases, into the trap of waiting one or two days too long,
because of uncertainty as to what was the actual date of publi-
cation.12
The courts, in applying this rule for the purpose of outlawing
stale claims, deny the injured party adequate protection against
releases by the publisher of copies of the libelous matter from
stock after the plaintiff has exhausted his remedy in the one suit
he is allowed.'3 If a large number of copies are thus released,
the claim may be far from "stale," yet the plaintiff is remediless.
The "single publication" rule is admittedly judicial legisla-
tion in an attempt to balance the conflicting interests of the pub-
lishing trade and the injured party. To give full effect to the
Newell, Slander and Libel (4 ed. 1924) § 175, 192; 3 Restatement of Torts, §
578, Comment b (1938).
5. Newell, Slander and' Libel (3 ed. 1914) 299, § 256.
6. Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119, 81 N.E.(2d) 45, 47 (1948).
7. This purpose is apparent in the language of the court in the principal
case, stating one purpose of the "single publication" rule to be "to give
effect to the statute of limitations," which has as one of its objects the
encouraging of promptness in bringing suit. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v.
Harriman, 227 U.S. 657, 57 L. Ed. 690, 33 S.Ct. 397, 401 (1913).
8. Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 4 N.Y.S. (2d) 640, 254 App.
Div. 211, affirmed 279 N.Y. 716, 18 N.E. (2d) 676 (1939).
9. Winrod v. McFadden Publications 62 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Ill. 1945);
Backus v. Look, Inc. 39 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Cannon v. Time, Inc.,
39 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Means v. McFadden Publications, 25 F.
Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 671 (E.D.
Pa. 1946).
10. Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Auddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193,
37 A.L.R. 898 (1921).
11. Restatement of Torts, § 942 (d).
12. See note 9.
13. Desmond, J., dissenting, 81 N.E.(2d) 45, 50; Winrod v. McFadden
Publications, 62 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Ill. 1945). The courts have attempted to
provide this protection through confusing and groundless distinctions be-
tween "sales from stock" and "reprints and reissues." Mack, Miller Candle
Co. v. Macmilan Co.,. 239 App. Div. 738, 269 N.Y.Supp. 33 (4th Dept. 1934),
affirmed 266 N.Y. 489, 195 N.E. 167 (1934). Also in distinguishing republica-
tions In such unsatisfactory terms as "passive" acts and those with "con-
scious intent." Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 4 N.Y.S.(2d) 640, 254
App. Div. 211, affirmed 279 N.Y. 716, 18 N.E. (2d) 676 (1939).
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policy considerations that led to its adoption, it is suggested that
the courts, while continuing to require suit to be brought within
one year of the original publication, should modify the rule so as"
to allow a new cause of action to accrue upon the first release of
a copy of the libelous matter subsequent to the rendering of judg-
ment in the preceding suit.1" Such subsequent copy and any that
follow it would, in turn, be governed by the single publication
rule, and the statute of limitations would start running with the
first publication after the preceding judgment. This process
might be repeated if the publications continue.
The proposed rule would encourage promptness in bringing
suit. The plaintiff, primarily interested in preventing the aggra-
vation of the injury to himself, would not be impelled to wait
the full statutory period before suing because of a fear of leaving
himself without future remedy if he sued promptly.
Some of the beneficial effects of an injunction accompany the
proposed rule because it would discourage the continued publica-
tion of the libel by putting the publisher on notice that future
releases of the libelous matter would subject him to a new law-
suit. A fundamental purpose of law is to prevent injury, and the
limiting of the injured party's remedy to a belated suit for dam-
ages (the result of the application of the present single publica-
tion rule) not only leaves that purpose unfulfilled, but encourages
the aggravation of injury.
This modification would continue to facilitate the outlawing
of stale claims, by requiring the injured party to institute suit
within one year after the cause of action accrues, but would not
bar an action by him on a fresh claim arising after such suit.
On the other hand, the suggested rule would give the pub-
lisher adequate protection against a multiplicity of suits, for he
has no just cause to complain if his deliberate act in releasing
matter adjudged by the court to be libelous gives rise to a new
cause of action.
It has been contended that the defining of what constitutes
the publication of a libel and the forming of rules applicable to
it are outside the scope of the court's functions and address them-
14. It is felt that damages should be assessed in each suit for the copies
released during the often lengthy period from filing of suit until rendering
of judgment by the trial court, to make unnecessary a new suit.in order to
recover for such copies. This is in harmony with the practice of courts in
cases involving continuing injuries. McCormick, A Handbook of the Law
of Damages (1935) 51, § 13; 4 Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Measure of Dam-
ages (9 ed 1912) 2585-6, § 1256 i.
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selves to the legislature, 5 because they are highly detailed and
technical problems involving weighty policy decisions. Be that
as it may, it is urged that until the legislature does so act, the
court should modify its single publication rule in order to achieve
the purposes for which it was adopted.
KENNETH RIGBY
MINERAL RIGHTS-UNAUTHORIZED EXPLORATION-The defend-
ant, with the consent of the state highway commissioner, con-
ducted a geophysical exploration from the public roads traversing
the lands of the complainant. The facts show that the soil in this
roadbed was owned by the complainant and that the state pos-
sessed a mere right of passage. The defendant was indicted for
unauthorized exploration of private land in violation of the pro-
visions of Act 212 of 1934.1 The defendant was found guilty, and
his conviction was affirmed on appeal, Justice Hamiter dissenting.
On rehearing, the supreme court reversed the decision and re-
manded the case, holding that the indictment and the proof were
at variance. The indictment charged the unauthorized explora-
tion of private lands, but the proof showed that the defendant had
conducted his exploration from public roads, the soil of which
belonged to the complainant. Held, defendant not guilty on the
theory that the roads in question were not "private lands" within
the meaning of the 1934 statute. State v. Evans, 38 So. (2d) 140
(La. 1948).
During the course of the trial, the defendant pleaded that
the 1934 statute had been impliedly repealed by Act 77 of 1940,2
which does not mention private lands, but which declares "public
lands" to be land "belonging to the state of Louisiana, or the title
to which is in the public," and specifically includes "rights of
way" within this definition. The second section of this statute
states that "the Commissioner of Conservation is hereby vested
with sole, exclusive and full authority to grant permits to any
person, firm, association, or corporation to conduct geophysical
and geological surveys on public lands." From the holding of the
15. Desmond, J., dissenting, 81 N.E. (2d) 45, 50.
1. La. Act 212 of 1934, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4826.1]. "It shall be un-
lawful for any person, firm or corporation .... to prospect, by ... any me-
chanical device .... for oil, gas or other minerals . . . on the public lands
of the state without the consent of the register of the state land office, or
on the public highways of the state without the consent of the Louisiana
highway commission, or on private property without the consent of the
owner; .... "
2. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) § 4719.10.
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